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In Kenya and around the globe SMEs have a proven track record as boosters of 
economic development by creating wealth and employment. They on the other hand 
face the major challenge of a lack financing since they have limited viable options where 
they can access financing, this study advances venture capital as a useful financing 
mechanism doubly beneficial to SMEs. 
In advocating for venture capital, its association with SMEs in Kenya is negatively 
affected by merger provisions within the competition laws that regulate the aspect of 
control. This thesis effectively argues that the merger regulations as contained in the 
Competition Act of Kenya, fail to account for venture capital activity in relation to the 
financing of SMEs. 
The thesis goes into detail expounding on the challenges the competition regulations 
raises that pertain to the venture capital sector. It finds that legal and regulatory 
competition policies that are scrutinized herein could possibly act as hindrances to the 
creation and development of venture capital companies in Kenya.  
This finding reflects positively on the hypothesis of the study, leading to the conclusion 
that restructuring the competition regulatory framework to better suit venture capital 
transactions would arguably benefit the venture capital sector and in turn aid SMEs and 
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This chapter begins by discussing the three main tenets that capture the thesis. This 
highlight ensures that these principles are easily understood and as such appreciated, 
even before the contentious issues that arise in the study are explored. The main tenets 
of this study as espoused by the thesis title and weaved together by the ensuing 
chapters are; venture capital, small and medium size enterprises, and competition law. 
With this discourse formulating a background; the research problem, hypothesis and 
the research questions are stated in succession. The chapter also offers a literature 
review and a theoretical framework; the methodology and approach the study puts to 
use is contemplated. Some limitations and assumptions faced as a result of conducting 
the study are pointed out and finally, a chapter layout is given. 
1.1 Background  
I. Venture Capital 
SMEs have served as major boosters of economic growth in developed countries and 
are widely recognized for it. In major economies around the world, this significant 
impact has come as a result of the key influence venture capitalism has held within the 
small business landscape.1  
In Kenya, SMEs control a key stake in the country’s Gross Domestic Product (Roughly 
34 per cent of the GDP)2 and overwhelmingly account for the employment workforce 
                                                          
1 Fannon I L, ‘The Luck of the Irish or Just Plain Old Tax Regulatory Planning? The Success of Venture 
Capitalism in Ireland’, 1(2), Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal, 2006, 231-256. HeinOnline, 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/eblwj1&i=231.  
2 Kenya National Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Kenya Business Guide and Strathmore Business 
School ‘MSME Development Towards a Five-Point Policy Framework’, Policy Brief Number 1, April 2018 
on August 10, 2019.     
2 
 
(Employing over 14.9 million people thus, 78 per cent of the entire labor force)3. These 
are highly positive figures; however, this thesis points out that SME owners have not 
used venture capital to acquire finance to support their businesses. With the cultivation 
of a vibrant venture capital industry, the implications could totally shift the outlook of 
the SME sector and as a result have a huge impact on the country’s economy.      
Venture capital firms act as intermediaries with the goal of furnishing small business 
startups that are groundbreaking in terms of innovation and have the capacity for 
growth and profitability.4 Major emphasis being placed on the innovativeness of the 
business; that is, business that are pushing the bounds; exploring new ideas and means 
of offering services, producing goods and availing products to consumers by leveraging 
the incredible technology our modern world has to offer. In Kenya, the SME sector is 
seeing a revival with small business owners finding success in the areas of trade, 
provision of services and manufacturing.5 It is a safe assumption that coupled with the 
concurrent advancement in the Kenyan technological space, a springboard for 
innovativeness in the trade, service provision and manufacturing sectors of our SME 
economy is being set in place. 
As it has been highlighted, “one important characteristic of many start-ups is the high 
risk due to the great uncertainty about returns, the lack of substantial tangible assets 
and the lack of a track record in operations.”6 Small business entrepreneurs face poor 
earnings at the early stages of the enterprise before they start realizing profits and as 
such, banks are reluctant to lend money to such entities. Given that, SMEs should be 
able to acquire capital from venture capitalists who get involved as partners in a 
                                                          
3 Kenya National Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Kenya Business Guide and Strathmore Business 
School ‘MSME Development Towards a Five-Point Policy Framework’, Policy Brief Number 1, 
4 Romain A, Pottlesberghe B, ‘The Determinants of Venture Capital: Additional Evidence’, Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Disussion Paper Series 1: Studies of the Economic Research Centre Number 19/2004, 1. - < 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Bruno_Van_Pottelsberghe/publication/23754893_The_Determin
ants_of_Venture_Capital_Additional_Evidence/links/0912f5105c7355b1a7000000.pdf> on 9 May 2019. 
5 The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Micro, Small And Medium Establishments (MSME) Survey: Basic 
Report’, September 2016, 3. 
6 Mondher C, Elouaer S, ‘Venture Capital Financing: A Theoretical Model’, 8(1) The Journal of Applied 
Businss and Economics, 2008, 56. -< http://www.na-businesspress.com/Cherif.pdf> on 9 May 2019. 
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business by “offering revenue sharing in the form of equity joint ventures in order to 
obtain necessary funding and to benefit from the venture capitalists’ experience in 
management and finance.”7 
Financing from venture capital is usually short term. As Bob Zider states, “the idea is to 
invest in a company’s balance sheet and infrastructure until it reaches a sufficient size 
and credibility so that it can be sold to a corporation or so that the institutional public-
equity markets can step in and provide liquidity.”8 
Venture capital is an extremely high risk business.9 Venture capital investors usually 
take a gamble by investing their money in enterprises that are untried and do not have 
a proven track record of success and or profitability. 10  When positioned against 
institutional financial lenders for comparison’s sake, venture capital is not secured by 
any form of collateral offered up by the borrower. “Viewed in this way, economic logic 
and historical precedent would suggest that venture capital is a derivative of the market 
rather than a product of public policy.”11  
Lawton concludes his work with a statement that is seminal to this study. He postulates 
that engaging in policy intervention through government by facilitating access to 
venture capital thus providing finance to SMEs can prove effective. As he puts it, “all 
capitalist models (including the US) are interventionist at this stage, driven by the 
desire to provide SMEs with access to a wealth creation cycle.”12 
                                                          
7 Wang S, Zhou H, ‘Staged Financing in Venture Capital: Moral Hazard and Risks’, 10(1), Journal of 
Corporate Finance, July 2002, 131-155. 
8 Zider B, ‘How Venture Capitalism Works’, Harvard Business Review, November-December 1998 Issue. 
https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works on 9 May 2019. 
9 Mondher C, Elouaer S, ‘Venture Capital Financing: A Theoretical Model’, 56 
10 Lawton C T, ‘Missing the target: Assessing the role of Government in Bridging the European equity gap 
and enhancing economic growth’, 4(1), Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 
2002, 7-23 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13691060110064246?needAccess=true on 9 
May 2019.   
11 Lawton C T, ‘Missing the target: Assessing the role of Government in Bridging the European equity gap 
and enhancing economic growth’, 11. 
12 Lawton C T, ‘Missing the target: Assessing the role of Government in Bridging the European equity gap 
and enhancing economic growth’, 21. 
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II. Small and Medium Size Enterprises  
Small and Medium Enterprises are entities owned and operated privately as 
corporations, partnerships or sole proprietorships which fit the criteria as has been set 
up by a particular jurisdiction. Aspects of the criteria for categorization include: the 
annual turnover of the business entity, the number of people hired as employees and 
the total worth of the assets within the entity’s portfolio.13 In Kenya, the classification of 
business enterprises is primarily done by looking at the number of employees engaged 
by firms and their turnover during a specific period of time.14  
For the purpose of venture capital, strict emphasis is placed on the fact that the SMEs 
have to be registered and operated as corporate entities. This insistence on the corporate 
form of registration is rooted in the understanding that SMEs offer up equity in the 
company to venture capitalists in order to obtain the much needed funding and the 
benefit of the venture capitalists’ experience in corporate finance and management.15 
It is relatively easy to incorporate a company in Kenya.16 The administrative processes 
involved have been simplified.17 In the modern legal world, incorporation is no longer 
viewed as a privilege bestowed by the state.18 People who own and operate businesses 
can freely set up companies with little complication and even sub divide the businesses 
into many different companies as a group in order to enjoy the advantages the 
corporate form offers. 19  The corporate form is the most chosen avenue for many 
businesses that want to raise capital because its features can be exploited in many 
different ways.20  
                                                          
13 Inclusive Economic Growth (IEG) Unit of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Kenya, 
‘Micro, Small and Medium-Size Enterprises (MSMEs) As Suppliers to the Extractive Industry’, January 2015, 14.      
14 Inclusive Economic Growth (IEG) Unit of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Kenya, 
‘Micro, Small and Medium-Size Enterprises (MSMEs) As Suppliers to the Extractive Industry’, January 2015, 14. 
15 Wang S, Zhou H, ‘Staged Financing in Venture Capital: Moral Hazard and Risks’, 131-155. 
16 World Bank Group, Doing Business 2020: Economy Profile Kenya, 8.   
17 World Bank Group, Doing Business 2020: Economy Profile Kenya, 8.   
18 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, 11. 
19 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 11. 
20 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 11. 
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One advantage is the shielding effect; those who run and or own businesses enjoy a 
shielding from financial exposure individually. 21  This has the effect of supporting 
business innovation since it allows room for the type of risk taking needed to get 
businesses off the ground.22 To sum this up, the corporate form has the ability to allow 
business operators full benefit from the business’ success and at the same time prevent 
them from absorbing the costs that arise from its failure.23  
This shielding effect is supported by two legal doctrines of company law, the first one is 
the doctrine of separate legal personality and the other one is the doctrine of limited 
liability. 24  Separate legal personality as pioneered by English law in 1897, 25  gives 
incorporated companies separate legal personhood and makes them distinct from its 
shareholders and managers. 26  As a result of this separation, ‘affirmative asset 
partitioning’27 is a possibility.28 Asset partitioning shields the business’ assets from the 
people behind the corporate veil that is the shareholders and the managers/directors 
and most importantly from the creditors of these people.29 This feature of the corporate 
form makes it very attractive for financiers because they can focus all their risk 
assessment efforts only on the particular company that they are servicing with capital.30  
The doctrine of limited liability provides that shareholders in a corporate entity limited 
by shares have the obligation of contributing a limited amount to the company’s 
assets.31 Shareholders gain protection by virtue of this doctrine because they do not 
have to contribute a single cent in excess of the amount they agreed to invest in the 
                                                          
21 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 11. 
22 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 11. 
23 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 11. 
24 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 12 and 15. 
25 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897], The United Kingdom House Lords.  
26 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 12. 
27 A term described in Hansmann H, Kraakmman R R, ‘The essential role of organizational law’, 110, Yale 
Law Journal, 2000, 387.  
28 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 12. 
29 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 12. 
30 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 13. 
31 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 16. Also lenders to companies are limited in their 
exposure because their liability is limited to the amount they contractually agreed upon.   
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company for their stipulated shares.32 This manner of shielding as achieved by limited 
liability has several positive ramifications.33 One that is crucially important to this study 
is that as a result of the principle of limited liability, the transferability of shares in a 
corporate entity becomes a possibility.34  
Barring the fact that a company may choose to restrict the transferring of shares in its 
articles of association, the shares in that limited company can be transferred freely as 
fungible securities.35 Venture capital transactions rely on the effective transfer of shares 
from the owner(s) of a company into the VCs docket. The SMEs therefore having a 
corporate form are in a position to offer up equity in exchange for the capital financing 
they require. 
It is apparent that SMEs execute a big role in the creation of jobs and amassing of 
wealth.36 Through the power of SMEs across the country run by Kenyans of diverse 
backgrounds socially, geographically and economically, Kenyans can gain access to 
affordable goods and services through its zealous and extremely resourceful 
entrepreneurs.37 
In Kenya, small and medium sized enterprise operations prevail in all sectors of our 
economy and play a part in sustaining the bulk of households.38 The Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics survey shows that small businesses flourish in the areas of trade, 
provision of services and manufacturing.39 Therefore, there is an increase of production 
                                                          
32 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 16. 
33 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 16. 
34 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 16. 
35 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 20. 
36 The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Micro, Small And Medium Establishments (MSME) Survey: Basic 
Report’, September 2016, 1. See also, Inclusive Economic Growth (IEG) Unit of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) Kenya, ‘Micro, Small and Medium-Size Enterprises (MSMEs) As Suppliers 
to the Extractive Industry’, January 2015, 15. 
37 The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Micro, Small And Medium Establishments (MSME) Survey: Basic 
Report’, September 2016, 3. 
38 The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Micro, Small And Medium Establishments (MSME) Survey: Basic 
Report’, September 2016, 3. 
39 The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Micro, Small And Medium Establishments (MSME) Survey: 
Basic Report, published in September 2016. 
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of goods and readily available services. The increase in production of goods and 
services translates to a growing number of skilled and also semi-skilled members of the 
work force.40  
Following that highlight of SMEs and their essential task in Kenyan economic 
progression and industrial development, SMEs make important contributions in 
ameliorating the socio-economic sectors of our polity by encouraging massive 
employment, promoting the entrepreneurial spirit and innovativeness among Kenyans, 
and increasing production of goods to levels allowing for exports.   
This thesis notes that an SME sector that is competitive and full of innovation holds 
substantial promise for developing nations like Kenya, when it comes to: higher income 
growth; attaining optimal use of domestic human resources; and having a more gainful 
alliance through regional economics and investment; and offering greater equity, 
dissemination and development.41 Therefore, to attain this level of competitiveness, 
Kenya must have an influx of support in the sector in terms of effective laws and 
particular regulations that seek to better the sector and protect the businesses from 
overreach, interference and exploitation by both the government and financiers.  
Most importantly, this sector has to have access to capital.  
Small and medium sized enterprises in Kenya require funds in the form of start-up 
capital and additional financial capital to be used as an economic resource essential to 
entrepreneurs and businesses which help them acquire what is needed in order to 
manufacture products and provide services to the economic sector they belong to. 
                                                          
40The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Micro, Small And Medium Establishments (MSME) Survey: Basic 
Report’, September 2016, 3. 




In accordance with statistics from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 42 
approximately 72 per cent of licensed businesses reported using funds from family 
members and or their own personal funds as the main source of capital when starting 
their business.43 The rest of the statistics show that 4.2 per cent of businesses received 
lending from family and friends to start-up. Bank financing accounted for 5.6 per cent 
towards the SMEs, Chamas (self-help groups) at approximately 1.4 per cent, with 
cooperatives at a rounded off figure of 0.5 per cent and governmental funds accounted 
for 0.1 per cent. Roughly 2.0 per cent of establishments reported their use of other 
origins of capital outside of those mentioned.44 
These are staggering figures considering that the SME sector has a pivotal stake in the 
country’s workforce and economy. There is vast need for alternative sources of funding 
for such business entities. 
The banking industry debacle 
Institutional financiers such as banks are failing when it comes to this mandate, 
especially so for SMEs.45 It has become common practice all over the world for banks to 
deny their small business clientele financial facilities.46 Economists have attributed this 
to be a result of the tightening of finance and institutional regulations after the 2008 
recession. Banks became extremely careful about the risks that they took, thus 
                                                          
42 A body instituted through an Act of Parliament, the Statistics Act, 2006, mandated under Section 4 to: 
Act as the principle agency Government for collecting, interpreting, analyzing and disseminating data in 
Kenya; be the Custodian of all official statistics and; conduct a census every 10 years among other 
functions.   
43 The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Micro, Small And Medium Establishments (MSME) Survey: 
Basic Report’, 41. 
44 The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Micro, Small And Medium Establishments (MSME) Survey: Basic 
Report’, 10. This Kenyan survey evokes similarities with the sources for corporate finance for SMEs in the 
UK as deduced by Ferran and Ho who find that SMEs in the United Kingdom rely heavily on internal 
financial avenues i.e. equity from owners, retained profits, loans from the directors and even 
shareholders  (Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 57).      
45 International Finance Corporation (IFC), World Bank Group, ‘MSME Finance Gap: Assessment of the 
Shortfalls and Opportunities in Financing Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Emerging Markets’, 2017, 1.  
46 International Finance Corporation (IFC), World Bank Group, ‘MSME Finance Gap: Assessment of the 
Shortfalls and Opportunities in Financing Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Emerging Markets’, 2017, 1.  
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tightening their credit standards to exclude a majority of small businesses which are 
riskier than their larger counterparts.47  
Ferran and Ho make a point of noting that SMEs dependency on banks and their failure 
to subsequently furnish their financial needs is not just a post 2007-2009 financial crisis 
issue, but has been a matter of concern stretching over many years.48 They opine that 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis led banks to undertake in massive deleveraging efforts 
exacerbating the problem of meeting the financial needs of SMEs thus bringing this 
issue to the fore front as a matter of political priority.49 They hold the view that the 
underlying fundamental issues of bank lending and SMEs are hardly new.50         
The risk involved for banks includes less profits since SMEs take out smaller loans, 
banks are unwilling to transact with them given that they carry a much higher risk of 
default when they could earn more profits by lending large sums to big corporations 
taking out sizeable loans that are properly collateralized.51  
Collateralization as understood in financial law as a result of its market usage requires 
that parties in a lending transaction appropriately determine their levels of exposure to 
each other under the transaction.52 It is identified that the debtor owes some amount to 
a party (“this is the secured party”). The debtor thus rightly has to put up assets in the 
nature of securities that equals the amount of their exposure.53 This collateral may either 
involve the secured party having the collateral transferred to them or having the 
                                                          
47 International Finance Corporation (IFC), World Bank Group, ‘MSME Finance Gap: Assessment of the 
Shortfalls and Opportunities in Financing Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in Emerging Markets’, 2017, 1. 
See also, International Finance Corporation (IFC), ‘Alternative Data Transforming SME Finance’ May 2017, 3.  
48 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 57. 
49 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 57. 
50 Ferran E, Ho C L, Principles of Corporate Finance Law, 57.  
51 International Finance Corporation (IFC), ‘Alternative Data Transforming SME Finance’ May 2017, 1.   
52 Hudson A, The Law of Finance, 2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2013, 1239.  
53 Hudson A, The Law of Finance, 1240. 
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secured party hold those assets and having the debtor retain proprietary claim in 
them.54  
In lending, banks require that the debtor provide ‘security’ for the credit forwarded to 
them to help assure the bank that the loan amount would be repaid.55 The bank has 
‘security’ when it has gained proprietary rights or possessory rights in the debtor’s or a 
third party’s property that it may use to ensure the loan would be repaid.56  This 
property is what is referred to as collateral.  
SMEs being high risk ventures given their likelihood to default on loan repayments 
have to make available to the lenders adequate collateral for the banks to sufficiently 
secure their interests and properly provide themselves cover for their exposure. Having 
this in mind, the challenge for SMEs to acquire financing from the banking sector 
because of a lack or poor collateralization is put into sharp focus.     
The banking sector in Kenya has exercised exorbitance in terms of the interest rates they 
charge for a long time.57 This is partly due to the oligopolistic nature of the sector,58 
where a few banks control close to half of the market share and therefore influence each 
other in pricing interest rates for their customers. 
As a result, due to political pressure, the Government instituted interest rate capping,59 
against the recommendations of the Central Bank of Kenya Governor.60 As one would 
                                                          
54 Hudson A, The Law of Finance, 1240. 
55 Ellinger E P, Lomnicka E, and Hare C V M, Modern Banking Law, 5th ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011, 808.   
56 Ellinger E P et al, Modern Banking Law, 808.   
57 Ngunjiri N, ‘The Shortcomings of Interest rate Capping in Kenya’, Business Daily, 20 December, 2018, - 
<https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/analysis/columnists/The-shortcomings-of-interest-rate-
capping-in-Kenya/4259356-4904284-tjhbcq/index.html> on 10 August, 2019 
58 Ochieng J, ‘Interest Rate Cap Two Years On: Outcomes for Kenya’s Economy’, Kenya Institute for 
Public Policy Research and  Analysis, 18 February, 2019, -< https://kippra.or.ke/interest-rate-cap-two-
years-on-outcomes-for-the-kenyan-economy/> On 10 August, 2019. 
59 Through the Banking (Amendment) Bill 2015 which went into effect in 14th September 2016 as The 
Banking (Amendment) Act No. 25 of 2016.  
60 Macharia K, ‘Interest Rate Caps Have Caused more harm to SMEs, Economy: CBK study’, Capital 
Business, 16 April 2018,-< https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/business/2018/04/interest-rate-caps-cause-
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expect, with lower interest rates, the lending to SMEs should increase because there is 
access to cheap funds but that is not the case. However, during that capping period, 
SME borrowers were still being dismissed by banks and more lending was afforded to 
government and large corporate firms, seeing a substantial reduction in credit to the 
private sector.61 
The CBK Governor in lauding the efforts to change the interest rate capping regulation 
that has adversely affected the economy by strangling the SME sector maintained his 
stance that a complete overhaul of the system is appropriate to allow for a system 
where banks use risk based mechanisms to grant loans.62 
The President taking the advice of the Treasury Department, and the Central Bank of 
Kenya wanted to see the interest rate capping provision in the Finance Bill abolished.63 
In a memo to parliament, the president exercised his veto powers and urged the elected 
representatives to delete the interest rate capping clause.64 His reasoning being that the 
capping failed to achieve its intended goal and instead ended up hurting SMEs by 
reducing their access to financing, also, the president pointed out that the capping led to 
a slowing down of economic growth and; rendered the CBK ineffective when it has to 
control monetary policy as a key aspect of its mandate thus making the CBK unable to 
adequately deal with economic shocks.65 
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As things stand, the interest rate capping provision was repealed by the 2019 Finance 
Act upon the President’s assent to the Finance Bill.66 Optimists expect that the repeal 
will signify good fortunes for the SME sector since they will be able to access credit 
from the banks.67 The most likely scenario is that there will be a return to the status quo 
pre- capping of the interest rates, with banks taking advantage of the repeal and acting 
in a preposterous manner.           
In Europe, the trend is similar. SMEs have faced problems in accessing funding.68 The 
European Union and national governments have created initiatives seeking to help 
them by encouraging banks to offer loans through guarantees or even avail themselves 
of cheap funding which is serviceable but still not enough. Many banks claim that it’s 
not cheap funding that they lack, but the required capital to back the loans they pitch 
with it.69  
In the United Kingdom particularly, solutions to this banking problem for SMEs remain 
elusive.70 The problem is attributed to a lack of competition in a banking industry that is 
highly concentrated.71 Official interventions in the UK with the intended objective of 
easing SMEs’ access to credit following the economic circumstances in the wake of the 
2007- 2009 financial meltdown; sought to pressure banks to increase lending to small 
businesses, and also back businesses by granting public guarantees for this type of 
funding. 72  They also created an alternative source of financing. 73  All these efforts 
however laudable have yielded limited success.74   
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In noting the hardships experienced by small businesses when it comes to securing 
funding from banks, David Goldin, writing for The Business Journal,75 states that: “It's 
nearly impossible these days to keep a small business running with money drawn from 
your own pocket. Whether it's purchasing inventory, hiring new employees, or opening 
additional locations, any type of expansion requires extra working capital.”76 
Accordingly, and for good reason, private-sector forms of financing which are more 
suitable for the modern day small business owner are growing.77 Examples include; 
venture capitalism, angel investments, crowd funding through online platforms among 
many others. 
So, when banks decline to offer loan facilities to SMEs, they should be able to access 
financing through alternative means, coming from other specialized private entities 
which exclusively furnish loans to small businesses with suitable terms conducive for 
their expansion. Venture capitalism provides such an avenue for small businesses. 
III. Competition Law 
At the core, competition law is made of rules designed to protect competition, 
prioritizing consumer welfare.78 Competition law has experienced phenomenal growth 
in recent years because of the urgent need to respond to the massive changes in global 
politics and economic behaviour.79  
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It is concerning that firms with market power have the ability to abuse consumer 
welfare by reducing production, increasing prices for commodities, offering low quality 
products to the market, snuffing out innovation and limiting consumers’ ability to 
choose from a range of products.80 The body of rules adopted to address these concerns 
cannot be tabulated and codified for precise application as is done with tax laws as an 
example.81 Matters of competition invariably require that market power be assessed on 
a case by case basis.82 Such assessment is conducted having in mind an understanding 
of economic concepts.83  
One has to be cognizant of both the law and economic principles.84 Anecdotally, a story 
is told that a competition attorney at a competition law forum painstakingly stated that 
according to him lawyers should be at the driving seat of any competition law 
proceedings. In agreement a competition economist pointed out that he actually 
preferred that arrangement since he loved being chauffeured. 85  Hopefully, the 
suggestion that there is a conflict between competition lawyers and economists is 
outdated as it should be; they work in tandem each offering valuable insight from their 
field of expertise.86 
To capture the need for competition laws, briefly describing the behaviors that trigger 
competition issues is a good place to start. These behaviors and practices harmful to 
competitive processes raise the need for competition law systems. The practices include: 
Having in force, anti- competitive agreements; these are unlawful agreements between 
firms whose objective would be restricting competition. 87  Agreements to avoid 
competition between competing firms as such leading to an increase in prices, 
agreements to fix prices; impede entry into a market, divide up markets and restrict 
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output of products are examples that result in severe punishment of the offender with 
certain jurisdictions dictating imprisonment of the responsible parties.88  
Abusive practices by a monopoly or dominant firm is also condemned.89 A firm which 
is large enough individually to raise their pricing by reducing output knowing that 
there won’t be any repercussions from the markets since there is only a single firm and 
entry into the market is difficult or on the other hand for firms enjoying dominant 
positions, the firm is large enough absorb the meagre losses from their consumers 
defecting.90Alternatively, dominant firms may reduce prices to amounts less than cost 
so that competitors are unable to cope hence driven out of the market.91 In essence, true 
monopolies are rare thus the introduction if the aspect of dominance.92  
Among many other concerns, a major concern for competition regulation of particular 
interest to this study is the issue of mergers. Competition authorities are enabled to 
investigate mergers that could prove harmful to the competition process.93 Horizontal 
mergers can demonstrate their anti-competitiveness if the firm that is formed has a 
monopoly/dominant market power, or the structure of the whole market which these 
two firms trade in becomes slanted; creating an oligopoly where only a few sellers have 
control over that market, making it very easy to coordinate on higher pricing.94 In that, 
consumers would be denied choice and probably end up paying high prices because 
one firm acquired a major competitor.95  
Many systems with competition regulation, Kenya being one of them; stipulate that 
some mergers cannot be finalized until the competition regulators’ approval is sought 
                                                          
88 Whish R, Bailey D, Competition Law, 2. See also, Elhauge E, Geradin D, Global Competition Law and 
Economics, 2nd ed, Hart Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 2011, 2.   
89 Whish R, Bailey D, Competition Law, 3. 
90 Elhauge E, Geradin D, Global Competition Law and Economics, 2. 
91 Whish R, Bailey D, Competition Law, 3. 
92 Elhauge E, Geradin D, Global Competition Law and Economics, 2.  
93 Whish R, Bailey D, Competition Law, 3.  
94 Elhauge E, Geradin D, Global Competition Law and Economics, 3. 
95 Whish R, Bailey D, Competition Law, 3. 
16 
 
and they green light the merger after conducting thorough assessment.96 Kenya by law 
has a set of principles and correlating guidelines that the regulator uses to determine 
the validity of merger proposals based on competition best practice. These regulations 
on mergers and how the aspect of control affects proposed merger transactions are 
tackled in the thesis and their negative effect for venture capital partnerships with SMEs 
is explored.          
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
SMEs in Kenya are a big boost to the economy even with the challenges that they face.97 
The key challenge facing SMEs is access to finance which helps the business owner to 
recapitalize and remain operational.  
As it stands, private-sector financing which is arguably more beneficial to SMEs is 
growing all over the globe as an alternative for institutional financiers.98 Private sector 
financing and in particular venture capital faces major hurdles in Kenya that are 
restrictive to its growth and prosperity.  
The competition laws and regulations in Kenya as they are undermine the operation of 
venture capital funds when they seek to partner with SMEs. The regulatory authority 
demands a strenuous compliance process because the law inaccurately deems venture 
capital partnerships with SMEs as mergers due to the aspect of change of control in the 
entity.  
The competition regulations enshrined read together with the regulator guidelines that 
have been issued as constructed capture SME and VC financing transactions in their 
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ambit making them accountable for all intends and purposes to the competition 
regulator. Also, there is added strain to SMEs and venture capital funds because several 
regulators are involved, yet no action has been taken to harmonize the compliance 
processes. 
1.3 Hypothesis 
Restructuring the legal and regulatory framework governing mergers under the 
competition laws of Kenya and reviewing the provisions that unreasonably require 
notification of the regulator followed by a strenuous compliance process so as to make 
the regulatory landscape more responsive to the peculiarities brought about by VC 
financing of SMEs is a necessary step towards addressing the challenge of poor 
capitalization that SMEs face.  
1.4 Research Questions 
The main question that this thesis seeks to address is why a restructuring of the Kenyan 
competition regulatory landscape that negatively impacts venture capital funds and 
SMEs as they partner in business is necessary given the unique characteristics at play in 
these types of transactions. In doing so, the study asks the following essential questions: 
a) As things stand, what is the state of venture capital as a financial industry in 
Kenya? 
b) How does venture capital set itself apart with respect to financing of SMEs as 
opposed to other financial institutions? 
c) What are the specific competition laws and regulations that require modification 
to better suit venture capital financing of SMEs in Kenya?  
d) What are the recommendations based on the research that can stimulate the 





1.5 Literature Review  
In making the case as to the impact venture capital has had on the transformation and 
development of the SMEs they finance, Kenyan Authors Memba, Gakure and Karanja 
in their article,99 recognize the importance of the SME sector in the provision of goods 
and services and also as drivers of competition and innovation that the private sector 
needs to attain the levels of industrialization in the developed world.  
They rightly point out that a need for credit constrains the growth and maturation of 
the sector. This is caused by an absence of collateral to act as security together with an 
inappropriate system of laws and regulations that fail to recognize alternative strategies 
for lending that are quite innovative and effective. They posit venture capitalism as a 
non- banking financial mechanism, expecting that these SMEs that have had their 
growth limited due to a lack of capital will have the availability of a different channel of 
capital.  
The authors conclude that there is a twofold positive impact that venture capital helps 
realize within the SME sector. Economically, venture capital translates to growth in 
sales, profit, and even assets as well as an improvement in the management of finances 
in the business. Socially, venture capital impacting small businesses results in creation 
of more employment opportunities which improve lives and alleviate poverty.  
Capturing the underlying importance of venture capital partnership with the small 
business sector and the transformation of the sector that is realized, the article states 
that, “Venture capital not only assists SMEs in the provision of funds but also in the 
internal operations of the business especially in policy formulation.”100 They further 
note that “Therefore venture capital has demonstrated the business case for SME 
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investment. Nurturing them at crucial junctures in their development and laying the 
foundation for an emerging generation of locally owned large enterprises.”101  
In a similar study from Ghana analyzing the significant influence of venture capital 
financing and the growth of small businesses, Christian Biney found that SMEs 
partnering with venture capitalists were more effective when it came to sales and 
growth of employment.102  
The study wisely proposes that the Ghanaian government should encourage small 
business entrepreneurs to opt for venture capitalism as an alternative source of 
financing and, make venture capital accessible to SMEs by giving incentives to their 
investors through deliberate policy decisions like tax breaks or tax exemptions, which in 
turn would enable more venture capital funds to register and locate their operations in 
the country and offer services to many small businesses.103 This proposition should be 
applied in Kenya through reformations in the legal and regulatory structures to make 
the country a more conducive haven for venture capital investors. The particular 
reformations are addressed in the course of this thesis.   
In a Working Paper commissioned by the African Development Bank and the OECD 
Development Centre, 104  Celine Kauffmann notes that private sector growth and 
development varies across Africa with SMEs thriving in South Africa, in Mauritius and 
in North Africa because of the modern financial systems at play in those countries 
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coupled with favourable policies towards the private sector as compared to other 
countries within the continent.105  
According to her, Senegal and Kenya have constituted productive conditions to 
stimulate the enlargement of the private sector but similarities to do with the issue of 
lack of finances faced by small businesses arise.106 A resolution to this issue is increasing 
the availability of funds through private equity.  
Kaufmann identifies that Africa’s small businesses have limited “access to finance, 
which thus hampers their emergence and eventual growth. Their main sources of 
capital are their retained earnings and informal savings and loan associations (tontines), 
which are unpredictable, not very secure and have little scope for risk sharing because 
of their regional or sectoral focus.” 107  The working paper encourages use of non-
financial private sector institutions to expand the pool where small businesses can 
acquire funding. 
Professor Fannon studies the growth of venture capital in Ireland between the years 
1990 to 2006 in her article.108 The significant growth of venture capital investment into 
SMEs is pointed out and factors that led to the same are identified. She sets out that the 
economic growth in Ireland goes hand in hand with an increase in venture capital 
activity fanned by a flexible and responsive regulatory environment.  
Ireland and the United Kingdom are considered to be among the most advanced 
countries in terms of having taxation and legal environments that favour the 
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development of private equity, venture capital and entrepreneurship in Europe.109 For 
the third time in a row according to a study by the European Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association ,110 Ireland held a comparatively favourable climate for private equity 
and venture capital because among other factors, the country offers a suitable fund 
structure and incentives for investors thus retaining its high ranking position in 
Europe.111    
The same conclusions are drawn by Professor Fannon. A comparative imperative is 
offered in her study acknowledging that the same conditions intrinsic to Ireland’s 
success in venture capital may not work if transplanted to a different country.112 
There is hope though, given that she concedes that the regulatory framework in Ireland 
is flexible on matters of corporate law. She adds that the creation of innovative 
investment mechanisms that create an advantageous position for Ireland is significantly 
aided by “…a strong English speaking common law base…” 113  and a young and 
educated workforce are necessary for similar prosperous results if the Ireland method is 
to be adopted internationally.114 
Therefore, having a common law base, combined with the modernized corporate laws 
modelled after English laws, coupled with a young and educated workforce, Kenya 
could emulate the Irish model.   
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Some authors like Haksoo and Shin have expressed differing opinions when it comes to 
government policy incentivizing venture capital firms to increase investment.115 In their 
paper discussing the passing of a law that sought to promote venture capital companies 
by Korean law makers,116 advocate for an evolutionary process in the development and 
growth of a venture capital market, highlighting the venture capital market 
development in the United States as an example.  
They argue that enactment of laws that encourage venture capitalism on its own will 
not mirror the standards of success experienced by other countries. They opine that it is 
necessary for the government to simply be limited to providing infrastructural facilities 
necessary for a booming economic sector as opposed to being an active player in the 
private equity and venture capital sector. Further, they opine that governments should 
have a good grip on the complexities and multifaceted association that exists between 
venture capitalists and small business entrepreneurs.  
Their paper however, allows room for an eventuality where change in the form of 
revamping extant institutional frameworks, labour practices and policies making 
incentive structures operational are essential in order to promote innovation in a 
venture capital market.117  
1.6 Justification for the Study 
The literature surveyed creates justification for this research. It justifies the fact that 
government can and should initiate policy and make legal resolutions that favour 
development of venture capital. 
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There is ample proof from an abundance of studies conducted by other researchers that 
indicates the major problem for SMEs to be lack of financial capital. It is also evident 
that small businesses experience growth as a result of partnering with venture capital 
funds and so does the economy of a country. 
With that in mind, doing all that is humanly possible to rethink age old patterns and 
trends that have encumbered the SME sector is a necessity and approaching alternative 
sources of capital which SMEs can exploit should be a foregone conclusion. With 
venture capital featuring as the alternate source of capital for SMEs in this scenario, 
paving the way by easing undue regulatory encroachment into the sector is crucial.        
This study therefore, offers guidance and assistance to policy makers and lawmakers as 
they formulate laws and regulations that will hopefully prove to be conducive to 
venture capital financing in Kenya for the benefit of SMEs.  
1.7 Theoretical Framework 
I. The Competition Theory 
In beginning to understand this theory, some suppositions with their foundations in 
basic economics are made. Suppose that we lived in a world of perfect competition, and 
everything worked out well.118 Businesses can enter and leave markets at will with no 
cost, products are similar and the consumers are sufficiently informed.119 The economy 
is filled with so many businesses that none of them is big enough to influence market 
prices by altering production of goods; and the firms act independently of each other.120 
Competition among the businesses to make their sale numbers therefore pushes the 
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prices for goods and services down.121 Businesses that charge exorbitantly for products 
would be undercut by others that charge less.122 
In such a utopian economy,123 when demand for a product increased or the cost of 
making such product decreased leading to a situation where its suppliers made supra-
normal profits with their costs remaining constant, then; wanting a share of those 
profits, the suppliers would expand and entry into that market by other firms would 
escalate as well, increasing the supply of those products until the prices were driven 
down towards costs.124 With the vice versa being true, a delightful result would be that 
resources would be allocated towards markets that can efficiently provide value to 
consumers.125 Even better, such a market will do away with businesses that are not of 
value to buyers.126  
The situation in reality is rather different.127 Competition is imperfect; aspects such as 
entry and exit into a market or even expansion take time and are pricey.128 The products 
on offer by the suppliers are different because of differing brands or their attributes.129 
Also, information is limited. 130  Economies of scale therefore, dictate that a market 
cannot have numerous firms thus leaving each other without reason to consider how 
their decisions affect market prices.131 
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This reality creates a ‘workably competitive’132 market whose results create a state of 
affairs that is close enough to those achieved by markets deemed to have perfect 
competition.133 This is where competition laws come into play.134 The ideal state of 
having achieved perfect competition standards is used as a useful benchmark to help 
our markets identify inappropriate conduct and patterns that interfere with the market 
forces, creating a foundation and need for competition law.135  
Armed with this grasp of competition and the theory that undergirds it, granting it a 
necessary function in our society; is useful for purposes of this thesis because as the 
study progresses, this thesis seeks to demarcate venture capital transactions with small 
businesses from the application of certain competition rules and regulations as 
enshrined in Kenyan legislation. 
II. Public Interest Theory  
The global financial crisis of 2007 showed that the financial world is filled with dangers 
rising mainly from instability in the global economy and sometimes from human error 
and misjudgement.136 In order to ensure a degree of safety for the financial markets, 
regulation and supervision is imposed on financial service providers like banks and the 
likes because failure achieves catastrophic results for the customers and consumers of 
financial services.137 A bank failure can have disastrous effects on its clientele whether 
individuals with their personal savings or businesses.138 Their livelihoods are at stake. 
The collapse of a small or mid- sized bank let alone large bank could have a ripple effect 
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on the market causing financial panic.139 Financial regulation is therefore a serious issue 
of public concern.     
Regulation is always considered when discussing reforms in service sectors.140 There 
are many theories that inform how governments regulate to achieve development of an 
economy.141 
The public interest theory is of significance to this study.142 
The public interest theory as interpreted by Posner,143 is born out of the understanding 
that regulation is implemented retroactively responding to a public crisis in order to 
correct “inefficient or inequitable market practices.”144 Proponents of this theory aim for 
public benefit as their goal. Is the public well served by a regulation? Does the regulator 
inflict injury to the public with certain regulations?145 These are the questions that 
public interest theorists grapple with.   
Rooted in the notion that government can get involved and intervene to regulate 
market and sector inadequacies, public interest theory flourishes. The assumption is 
that, economic markets are really fragile and are prone to operate inefficiently if left to 
                                                          
139 Ellinger E.P et al, Modern Banking Law, 27.  
140 Nyang’era A, ‘Accessing Venture Capital: assessing the legal and regulatory framework for the growth 
of the venture capital industry in Kenya, published, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, 2009, 12. 
141 Nyang’era A, ‘Accessing Venture Capital: assessing the legal and regulatory framework for the growth 
of the venture capital industry in Kenya, published, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, 2009, 12. 
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Davis K C, Administrative Law Treatise, St. Paul: West, 1958 and 1970 supplement, and Friendly H J The 
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144 Posner R, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’, 335.  
145The word Regulator is a catch-all phrase to include actors such as legislators, commissioners, or 
bureaucrats. As informed by Crowley S, ‘Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process’ Colombia Law Review, 1998, 66 http://www.jstor.org/stable/1123396 on 20 November 2019.   
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their own devices, intervention through government regulation/deregulation at 
virtually no cost is all-important.146  
This theory within the confines of this study encourages government bureaucracies to 
assess the venture capital market and offer support by easing the competition 
regulatory environment that is burdensome for venture capital funds and SMEs. 
This study posits the idea that restructuring legal frameworks and regulatory policies 
that govern venture capital in Kenya will be productive and result in the increase of 
venture capital investors in the Kenyan market to service SMEs’ financial needs.   
Therefore, adjustments will have to be made addressing how venture capital firms are 
unnecessarily subjected to undergo cumbersome regulatory checks and procedural 
hoops that are time wasting because competition laws deem them necessary as they 
seek compliance from the competition authority in their efforts to partner with SMEs. 
With the necessary modifications to the laws and regulations, Kenya will become a 
destination for venture capital investors who will seek to carry out business locally and 
also open up and explore the wider East African market. 
1.8 Methodology and Approach  
The methodology applied in this thesis is qualitative in nature. Desk-based research 
with library facilities and online academic repositories were engaged. This study 
depends mainly on the exploration and analysis of primary and secondary sources of 
data. Primary sources contain direct and firsthand evidence of an occurrence or an idea. 
They may include historical documents and surveys conducted by individuals and 
organisations. In this research the primary sources used are Acts of Parliament forming 
part of the Laws of Kenya and surveys carried out by organisations. Secondary sources 
of literature have the aspect of interpretation, that is, say the primary sources have been 
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analyzed and commented upon an example being articles in scholarly journals. This 
thesis makes use of secondary sources such as books, journal articles, working papers, 
reports, other theses and, news articles.   
In terms of approach, the study adopts a case study, historical, normative and 
theoretical approach. The theoretical approach analyses existing theories of economics 
and governance posited over the years by influential writers and scholars; the theories 
applied in this thesis are theories that favour the objectives of the study being 
undertaken. 
The thesis delves into the subject by utilizing the case study approach, that is, the focus 
for the study is limited within specific geographical confines with its jurisprudential 
system. Particular effort is made to contextualize the discussions in this thesis and offer 
analysis that is relevant to Kenya.  
The study uses the historical approach in tracing the account of venture capital as it 
developed and its existence in Kenya to become a viable method of financing SMEs. 
This approach is called upon all through the thesis but heavily features and is relied 
upon in chapter 2 of the study. The normative approach appearing mainly in chapter 3 
is used in discussing the competition legal and regulatory framework that threatens and 
undermines the growth and expansion of the venture capital sector in Kenya.   
1.9 Limitations and Assumptions  
The main limitation faced in conducting this research was a lack of local data to work 
with. Internationally, topics like Venture capital, competition and SMEs have been 
widely researched and for many years now. One can trace developments, challenges 
and changes in these subsets easily. In Kenya, that is not the case. As is pointed out, 
venture capital is not yet a developed financing mechanism; data showing numbers in 
monetary terms injected into the Kenyan market is either regionalized and or 
compounded with figures typifying classical private equity financing. The competition 
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laws in Kenya were enacted less than a decade ago and as a result of that, certain 
aspects of the laws with wildly different implications given the same set of facts and 
laws like the ones considered in this thesis have not been challenged before courts of 
law to test their application. 
This study is limited in terms of scope since focus will be placed only on a single 
country that is Kenya, detailing the journey of venture capital and looking at the legal 
and regulatory measures together with regulatory policies that have been initiated over 
the years. Therefore, any effort to transplant the ideas espoused and conclusions arrived 
at to a different country with a different legal system could prove to be futile. 
The study assumes that venture capitalism is the best way to go in addressing the issue 
of financing that is of major concern to SMEs. The researcher acknowledges that there 
are other sources of capital financing in existence. During the course of the study, the 
thesis will endeavour to put up reasons to support the concept that encouraging 
venture capitalism is the best possible approach.   
An assumption can be made that this is a quick fix approach to aid the growth of SMEs 
and that once the laws and regulations dealing with the subject of venture capitalism 
are retrofitted, everything changes leading to an instantaneous gains. This mindset is 
deceptive since the idea of venture capital is by far and large a foreign concept to many 
small business owners qualifying for such financial investment. They may not be 
receptive to the idea at first. Therefore, a labour intensive awareness campaign may 
have to be put into effect targeting SMEs and relaying the benefits that come across as a 
result of venture capitalism. 
1.10 Chapter Breakdown 
The goals of this study are satisfied within five unique chapters, this chapter being 
introductory in nature. It gives the background to the problem by tackling the main 
tenets setting up the thesis. The research problem, hypothesis, research questions, 
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literature review, theoretical framework, methodology, approach, some limitations, 
assumptions and finally, the chapter layout follow in that succession. 
The Second chapter pointedly discusses the development of venture capital in Kenya, 
contextualizing the problems faced by venture capital funds. Some efforts that have 
been made by the government to enhance the sector are considered in the chapter as 
well.  
The third chapter very briefly gives historical background to the growth of venture 
capital as an alternative means by which SMEs access financing. The chapter for the 
purposes of this study specifically looks at the aspect of control in venture capital. The 
chapter is informed by the wealth of knowledge that exists since the pioneering of 
venture capitalism. 
Chapter four interrogates competition regulations that are inconsistent with how 
venture capitalism works in financing SMEs in respect of the question of control 
previously raised in the preceding chapter. This chapter contemplates some of the laws 
and regulations in Kenya that are unappealing to venture capital operations with SMEs.  
In the fifth chapter, conclusions to the study are made, the research questions are 
answered, and the thesis is signed off by confirming the hypothesis and offering a few 









A SYNOPSIS OF VENTURE CAPITAL IN KENYA 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the state of venture capital in Kenya is analyzed; the analysis employs 
the use of regional data to some extent since the Kenyan VC scene is still in its 
sophomoric stages thus unable to produce sufficient data that can be researched to give 
an adequate glimpse into the VC industry. The development of VC or lack thereof is 
scrutinized; this scrutiny involves assessing the legal and regulatory framework that 
has been installed to undergird venture capital activity, and, pointing out factors that 
make Kenya an attractive destination for venture capital investment. Some of the main 
challenges facing the VC industry are also discussed. 
2.2 The Kenyan Venture Capital Story 
Sub- Saharan Africa has been an unattractive region for investments from western 
countries and corporations.147  This sentiment is cultivated by factors such as poor 
infrastructure, unstable political environments, low levels of educated persons among 
the populace, and poor purchasing power in the region due to the high levels of 
poverty. 148  As a result, the likelihood of private investors finding worthwhile 
investment opportunities is curtailed.149 
While attracting private investments was difficult, developed nations injected a massive 
amount of financial aid to the sub-Saharan region with the aim of lifting the African 
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continent out of poverty and hopelessness. 150  The financial aid was dedicated to 
alleviate the levels of poverty that brings with it malnutrition, inadequate health care, 
housing and sanitation.151 
At the beginning of the previous decade, Africa started to emerge.152 There was steady 
growth economically that led to an emergence of a substantial continental middle 
class.153 Profitable private sector investment became a real possibility particularly so in 
the information, communications and technology sector in Nigeria and Kenya.154 
Consequentially, private investments were made in the region intended to exploit the 
accelerating growth in the economy by copying business models that had proved 
successful in the advanced economies.155 In turn, the private investments made into the 
region surpassed the financial aid that had been granted by the developed nations.156 
The term “developed nation/world/economies” is used in this chapter to refer to 
countries that fit into the criteria set up by the World Economic Situation and Prospects 
(WESP).157 WESP categorizes nations/economies into three broad classes: developed, 
developing and transitional economies;158 for countries that can be classified as either 
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developing or developed based on the evaluation of characteristics they present.159 The 
classification is based on the level of development countries have achieved determined 
by gross national income per capita levels set up by the standardized World Bank 
threshold;160 thus qualifying counties/economies as low income, low middle income, 
upper middle income and high income.161          
A decade ago, the newcomer; venture capital and private equity industry in Africa was 
confined to the southern region of Africa.162 Most of the venture capital and private 
equity investments into Sub-Saharan Africa went to South Africa,163 with Kenya and 
Nigeria trailing behind.164 Post the 2008 global financial crisis, Africa’s resilience and 
continued economic growth led to an increase in private equity investment, with a 
much wider focus beyond South Africa.165        
Kenya offers regulatory stability for a thriving business environment that makes 
possible the comparatively impressive economy led by the private sector within East 
Africa.166 For this reason, Kenya has become a desirable destination for private equity 
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investment.167 It is noteworthy that for a country its size, with its population; Kenya 
ranks third in alternative investment behind South Africa and Nigeria.168 
In contemplating regulatory stability, this chapter views that regulatory stability is not 
achieved when there is a ban on any changes to current regulations.169 Regulatory 
stability envisions that there is in place substantive and procedural measures in the 
regulatory sphere that allow a country to make trustworthy commitments with 
investors.170  
This translates to having law making procedures that are not shrouded in secrecy, 
affording public participation in the making of laws and regulations before they are 
implemented and removing the arbitrariness that is usually employed by the regulatory 
machine.  
With such measures in place, countries are less likely to renege on their commitments to 
investors instituted through policy and regulations.171 The upside being that they enjoy 
investments at a higher rate.172 For purposes of this thesis, this chapter accedes that for 
the most part, Kenya reasonably enjoys regulatory stability. Said regulatory stability is 
complemented by adherence to the rule of law critical to enforcement of contracts as is 
explained later on in this chapter.      
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Kenya and more specifically Nairobi city offers an advantage to investors who seek to 
penetrate the East African Market.173 Based on factors such as; good quality of life, 
availability of human capital, adequate transportation and competent service providers 
like lawyers and accountants, Nairobi by merit makes for a good investment hub, 
serving the entire East African region.174 For the same factors, Nairobi boasts as home to 
the private equity association- the East African Venture capital Association (EAVC) an 
organization set up in early 2013, to conduct advocacy on behalf of venture capital and 
private equity investors.175 
The private equity landscape in Africa has seen Kenya play a significant role in terms of 
transaction size. 176  According to the survey on private equity and venture capital 
conducted by Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation Global Practice, as part of the 
World Bank Group,177 the number of private equity deals rising by twenty nine percent 
for the time period between 2010 to 2014 from zero in the period before 2007, and the 
size of the transactions shows that the Kenyan market has matured.178 
Venture capital investment in Kenya has less capital compared to private equity.179 This 
is because of the more specialized fashion in which venture capital funds have to 
operate in provided that there are high risks of partnering with start up businesses 
coupled with the macroeconomic risks that come with operating within the African 
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territory.180  As such, when contrasted, venture capital funds have less capital than 
private equity firms. Still, even with the challenge of capital, helped by massive 
technological companies like Safaricom and mPesa, Kenya maintains its status as a nerve 
centre for venture capital in Africa.181 
Lingelbach indicates in his doctoral thesis that the case is similar in South Africa.182 He 
suggests that the venture capital sector is not as flourishing compared to private equity 
leaving the future of venture capital highly uncertain.183 He further points out that the 
success of private equity is driven by availability of credit which supports buyouts;184 
investors seek to purchase entire enterprises that they find have a promising potential 
for quick growth and profitability. He also suggests that the high returns occasioned by 
the profitability involved in private equity plays a role in crowding the start-up 
financing sector leaving little room for venture capital presence.185 
2.3 Foundational legal and regulatory framework for venture capital  
Currently, Kenya lacks comprehensive laws/regulations that encompass venture 
capital. Regulation for venture capital is dispersed in different legislations. This lack of 
an all inclusive piece of legislation specifically for VC is not catastrophic to the industry. 
However, it creates redundancies and regulatory disarray. The main applicable law for 
VC is the Capital Markets Act. 186  Secondary legislations are; the Capital Markets 
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(Registered Venture Capital Companies) Regulations,187 2007 and the Income Tax Act 
(Venture Capital Enterprise) Rules, 1997.188  
I. The Capital Markets Act  
The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) in Kenya acts as the main regulator for VC 
funds. 189  The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) is an autonomous public agency 
chartered by Chapter 485A Laws of Kenya (the Capital Markets Act). The CMA is 
responsible for the supervision, monitoring and licensing of the activities of market 
players.  
The functions that the CMA carries out include:190 Developing the capital markets with 
emphasis on removing impediments and incentivizing long term investments in 
profitable enterprises,191 enabling the public to have greater participation in the capital 
markets by facilitating a nationwide system of securities exchange, 192  creating, 
maintaining and regulating a fair, orderly and efficient market where securities are 
issued and traded in and participants in the system are practically for all intends and 
purposes self regulating their activities,193 protecting investor interests including by 
facilitating a compensation fund to cater for financial loss investors suffer when 
dealers/brokers fail to meet their contractual obligations, 194  and facilitating the 
development of electronic commerce within the capital markets.195 
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The Capital Markets Act (RVCC) Regulations, 2007 
The Capital Markets (Registered Venture Capital Companies) Regulations, 2007 were 
created by the CMA in exercise of their mandate under Section 12 of the Capital 
Markets Act.196 The Capital Markets Act defines a registered venture capital company to 
be a company that has been certified by the Authority, being duly incorporated with its 
business model being the provision of risk capital to SMEs in Kenya that have a high 
potential for growth.197 The threshold of not less than 75% of the fund is stipulated to be 
invested in eligible enterprises in equity or quasi- equity form.198 The Capital Markets 
(RVCC) Regulations, 2007 prescribes a checklist of requirements on matters of eligibility, 
fund managers, registration, deregistration, reporting standards and obligations, and 
investments that venture capital funds have to meet.  
I. The Income Act (Venture Capital Enterprise) Rules, 1997 
The Income Act (Venture Capital Enterprise) Rules, 1997 defines a VCC as a company 
duly incorporated in Kenya whose purpose is investing in new or growing venture 
enterprise.199 
Rule 3 Mandates that venture capital companies be registered by the Commissioner for 
income tax.200  Such registration is effective once the commissioner is satisfied that 
certain requirements have been met.  
These requirements include: 201  Having gained proper incorporation in Kenya as 
envisaged by the directives of the Companies Act;202 the purpose for incorporation as 
stipulated in the corporations’ articles of association should be to invest in new and 
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expanding enterprises; stipulation that before the commissioner approves registration; 
the company should be already registered by the Capital Markets Authority; 
stipulations as to management of the company by a fund manager whose qualifications 
are expounded upon by the Capital Markets (RVCC) Regulations, 2007; Similar to the 
Capital Markets (RVCC) Regulations there is provided that 75% or more of the fund be 
invested in enterprises; and,  stipulation that the company only invests in enterprises 
conducting approved activities. 
At any given time, when a VCC fails to meet the prescribed qualifications, the 
Commissioner has the authority to give notice in writing to the fund manager signalling 
the withdrawal of registration of the VCC.203  
There are activities that are explicitly prohibited. A VCC cannot be involved in banking 
and financial service activities; retail and wholesale trade services and carrying out real 
property trading.204 
The eligibility clause presents a challenge for foreign VCFs because it requires that there 
must be independent directors making up a third of the board of directors,205 and that 
the appointed auditor and secretary of the VCC must be a member of the Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants of Kenya and the Institute of Certified Public Secretaries of 
Kenya respectively. 206  This requirement is restrictive thus making it difficult for 
foreigners to engage in VC operations in Kenya. Leeway should be given and 
exemptions made to this provision.  
II. The Companies Act, 2015 
Some other key laws such as the Companies Act, 2015 are also applicable to VCFs since 
the Capital Markets (RVCC) Regulations require that venture capital funds be 
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incorporated under the Companies Act; a requirement that should be re-examined and 
changed since VC funds are typically registered as partnerships in most jurisdictions,207 
and considering also that incorporation has taxation implications that are unfavourable 
to investors. The tax implication that arises when the vehicle of registration is a 
partnership is advantageous because a corporate tax is not charged to the partnership. 
The partners are taxed individually based on the income they gain from the partnership 
venture. 
Additionally, the registration process for VCFs is unnecessarily lengthy and repetitive. 
It also raises cost implications that are expensive. The application process to accomplish 
registration is based on the fulfilment of many requirements relying on a variety of 
documentation from different offices/registries. Payment of fees is done at the multiple 
stages of registration some of which are needlessly repetitive.  
For example, conducting registration with CMA and also with the Commissioner for 
income tax under the Income Tax Act rules presents a redundancy especially since the 
requirements to be met by a VCF mandated by both offices are similar. Such 
redundancies accomplish the task of making the registration of VCFs in Kenya a highly 
expensive and cumbersome endeavour.     
The CMA has failed in its mandate to by failing to completely remove impediments and 
incentivize long term investments in profitable enterprises in the case of venture capital 
investment.208 Combing through the VC legal and regulatory framework, one finds that 
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2.4 Exit options for venture capital investors      
A major challenge that exists for the venture capital industry in Kenya is the absence of 
commercially feasible exit options.209 As explored in detail in the next chapter, exit is 
crucially important in venture capital arrangements. Venture capitalists plan 
beforehand to recover their investment plus any forthcoming returns.210 As D. Gordon 
Smith writes,211  “Before venture capitalists invest, they plan for exit.” Exit enables 
venture capitalists to reallocate funds paired with the non-monetary contribution like 
management expertise that accompanies their activity by reinvestment into other start-
up businesses in need of capital.212 
Without viable exit options, venture capitalists are not able after investing; to return the 
investment, plus returns to their investors proving the validity of their thesis on 
investment in start-ups within their portfolio with legs to stand on when they ask for 
more funds to invest based on their record of generating returns.213 It is an attractive 
prospect to start venture capital funds with the knowledge that other funds have 
successfully enhanced the growth of early stage companies and managed to make 
profitable exits for the benefit of their limited partners.214 
The public markets which usually offer venture capitalists an avenue for achieving 
liquidity in the developed world are underutilized in Kenya.215 Investors recognize the 
absence of IPOs in certain countries when considering making investments into those 
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countries through private equity.216 For instance, to explain the gravity of the situation, 
the Kenyan capital market (the NSE) had no Initial Public Offers (IPOs) for the years 
2016 and 2017.217 This fact does not isolate Kenya alone, in Africa; the trends are similar 
across the continent. Most capital markets in African countries are not developed to a 
point where the actors have deep financial reservoirs thus making the market liquid.218 
In South Africa, a nation that has broad and deep capital markets among the emerging 
markets saw rapid growth in IPO activity competing with major capital market players 
like the United Kingdom and then dwindled thereafter.219   
The most utilized method of exit is through share buybacks when entrepreneurs are 
able to acquire back the shares that had been allocated to the venture capitalists, trade 
sales when an investor purchases the business and secondary sales when a venture firm 
sales off the business to another financial institution.220  
The private equity and venture capital scene in South Africa as well places little reliance 
on IPOs as an avenue for exit;221 this contrasts with the situation in developed markets 
where VC funds gain attractive returns when they exit through share sales.222    
 
  
                                                          
216 Divakaran S,  McGinnis P, Schneider S, ‘ Survey of the Kenyan private equity and venture capital 
landscape’, 18. 
217 Ngunjiri J, ‘No offers in two years as NSE suffers IPOs drought’, Business Daily, 7 March 2018 -< 
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/markets/capital/No-offers-in-two-years-as-NSE-suffers-IPOs-
drought/4259442-4332336-1394vli/index.html/> on 29 Jaanuary 2020.   
218  Oteh A, ‘Making capital market work for SMEs in Africa’, 5.  
https://cmauganda.co.ug/files/downloads/Capital%20Markets%20and%20SMEs%20Blog%20articule%
202.pdf on 29 January 2020.  
219 Lingelbach D C, ‘Neither Pirates nor Politicos: The Emergence of Venture Capital in Weak Institutional 
Environments’, Published PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, Exeter, 2009, 152.   
220 Divakaran S,  McGinnis P, Schneider S, ‘ Survey of the Kenyan private equity and venture capital 
landscape’, 19. See also, Otuki N, ‘Huduma Centres push Kenya up in ease of doing business index’, 
Business Daily, 28 October 2015. 
221 Lingelbach D C, ‘Neither Pirates nor Politicos: The Emergence of Venture Capital in Weak Institutional 
Environments’, Published PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, Exeter, 2009, 152.   
222 Lingelbach D C, ‘Neither Pirates nor Politicos: The Emergence of Venture Capital in Weak Institutional 
Environments’, Published PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, Exeter, 2009, 153.   
43 
 
2.5 Ease of doing business in Kenya 
Remarkable improvements have been seen in the ease of doing business index.223 Kenya 
has improved in the rankings by 28 positions from being ranked at number 136 in 2014 
to 108 in 2015, the start of an impressive climb.224 Kenya has made advancements 
because of its push to reform how business and property registration is conducted, 
making it easier to start businesses in the country.225 Specifically, the World Bank notes 
that the launch of Huduma Centres which brings together a variety of government 
services under one ‘roof’ catalyzed the performance in the Doing Business index.226 At 
the moment, Kenya ranks at number 56, with a score of 73.2,227 this ranking attracts 
venture capital investment.228  
An aspect that influences the ease of doing business index ranking in Kenya’s favour is 
its enforcement of contracts. 229  It takes 465 days to resolve contractual disputes 
judicially in Kenya compared to the average of 654.9 days for countries in the Sub-
Saharan Africa region.230 Quality of the judicial processes index in Kenya is at 9 out of 
18 comparatively, in Sub-Saharan Africa the average is at 6.9.231  
Enforcement of contracts grounded in a stable rule of law environment is vital for the 
venture capital industry. Investors understand that this factor can affect the operations 
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of a business as a going concern until the point of exit for the venture capitalist.232 
Therefore, venture capitalists will not invest in countries where contracts cannot be 
enforced and such enforcement takes a lengthy period of time and costly price 
implications for conflicts to be resolved.233 
2.6 Conclusion 
This overview of venture capital in Kenya offers insight into the potential that the 
industry has for further growth that would end up being beneficial to SMEs not only in 
Kenya but also possibly for the wider East African region. There is a vacuum created by 
the unwillingness of banks to finance SMEs. This vacuum should be occupied by 
specialized financial institutions like venture funds. The VCFs have the ability to thrive 
given the benefit of a primed economy with a welcoming business environment. The 
challenges that have been noted have to be resolved with time in tandem with the 
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CONTROL IN VENTURE CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to analyse how venture capital works. In doing so, venture capital is 
explained with the aim of giving further insight into the aspect of control. Control can 
be deduced from understanding what venture capital is all about. Venture capital 
contracts have characteristics that differ from other forms of financing available in the 
financial markets, thus implying negative consequences when confronted with the 
competition regulatory provisions. The chapter tackles how those connotations arise. 
3.2 Fundamental insights of venture capital 
Preliminarily, it is important to establish that venture capital has no standard or fixed 
definition. 234  Features attributed to venture capital provides some clues in 
understanding venture capital, and in that way a functional definition of venture capital 
can be coined.235  
The attributes of Venture Capital   
Venture capital investment strategy is characterised by attributes such as:236  
A keen interest in new technological industries, products, and techniques characterize 
VC investment. Because VCs fund small companies having the potential to quickly 
grow, they look for industries that have large markets and businesses that have some 
kind of technological advantage over other entities in that same market.237 
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VCs emphasize that there be active and even in some instances controlling participation 
in the affairs and daily operations of the business entity that they have invested in; they 
offer technical assistance in the form of corporate governance- they make investments 
in outstanding entrepreneurs in order to build their capacity to capably run the 
business inasmuch as they invest in the business plans signifying outstanding future 
prospects.  
VC financing comes in at the early stages of development of a business but crucially, 
not before intellectual property rights have been secured by the business. These IP 
rights are inherently valuable for companies in the information technology and health 
sector industries that are preferred by VCs. 238 Having these IP rights secured offers 
SMEs an advantage in their quest to acquire VC financing. 
Additionally; VC funding is typically offered for a period ranging from one year to a 
period of about ten years, then the exit follows through the securities markets by 
offering an IPO or sale of the whole enterprise by way of mergers and acquisitions  
VC investments are made where the VCs have assessed the business and have 
ascertained that they can be of value to the business by offering their technical, financial, 
and managerial skills and expertise. In modern times, the possibility of financiers 
providing SMEs with more services than just capital has been examined.239 The VC 
industry offers other financiers a glimpse into what that world might look like. VC 
firms are institutions that ‘nurse’ companies as opposed to simply financing them.240  
It is common practice in the VC industry for VCs to offer financing in rounds, 
additional capital is injected into the business in various stages. The stages progress 
from the seed stage to the mezzanine round/stage when successful exit is attainable.    
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From these attributes discussed, a definition of venture capital can be deduced. In 
essence therefore, venture capital can be defined as “equity or equity-linked 
investments in young, privately held companies, where the investor is a financial 
intermediary who is typically active as a director, an advisor, or even a manager of the 
firm.”241 
3.3 Venture Capital Financing of SMEs 
Venture capital at its onset developed because of market factors, there was a demand 
for high risk, high return investments which is a key feature of venture capital 
investment.242 Venture capital contracting aligns when profitability is coupled with 
control mechanisms.243 Venture capitalists want to invest in businesses that are more 
likely to create economic incentive for them and also require that they monitor the 
business to safeguard their investment. 
Players in the VC industry principally comprise of; entrepreneurs who start small 
businesses, venture capitalists and investors who are willing to take the risk involved in 
VC by placing their investment into a venture capital fund.244 Entrepreneurs after a 
while face the challenge of capital to expand business operations and therefore seek 
financing from investor-backed venture capitalists.  
Presently, institutional investors as opposed to individual investors, make for a large 
percentage of the investor base in the VC industry.245 Institutional investors comprise of 
other financial institutions such as hedge funds, pension funds, and investment banks 
just to mention a few; these are institutions that have funds and specialize in investment 
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of those funds for themselves or for their clientele. Individual investors account for 
extremely wealthy individuals with funds to spare who would not mind having that 
money tied up in a venture capital fund for a number of years.  
Venture capitalists are able to operate by pooling funds from investors and invest them 
in businesses carried out by entrepreneurs making the businesses a part of the portfolio 
managed by venture capitalists.246 
Venture capitalists identify young companies (SMEs) and invest funds in them hoping 
that the value of those SMEs might increase greatly in the future; they earn their profits 
some years down the line when the business enters the public market through issuing a 
share offer or other exit strategies when the company is sold for more than the amount 
that was invested.247  
Such description of functions creates similarities between venture capitalists and other 
professional investors who are experts in identifying, buying and selling equities in the 
financial markets. 248  However, despite the similarities shared, venture capital 
distinguishes itself in a manner that makes it more appealing, especially so for SMEs.  
Venture capital combines access to financing with active managerial supervision over 
the SMEs with the aim of achieving gains on the capital invested justifying the high 
financial risk undertaken by the venture capitalists.249  
To further elaborate, once an initial investment is made into a small business, a venture 
capitalist also stakes their expertise, time, managerial skills and leverages their 
connections in guiding and nurturing the business into success and profitability.250  
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The best VC firms derive their success from accurately profiling and earmarking 
promising young businesses and from actively inculcating measures that add value in 
the day-to-day running of those businesses.251 In this manner, venture capital is less like 
a speculation on the future prospects of a company by venture capitalists, and more like 
active involvement in creating said future prospects that will reflect positively on their 
bottom line.252 The VCs do so by relying on their talents and connections.253   
It is important to revisit the fact that venture capital is integral to the aspect of job 
creation in the SME sector.254 This is because early venture investment in SMEs focuses 
exclusively on businesses that intend to grow rapidly.255 Fast growing companies will 
have the capacity to hire employees to fit the needs of a growing outfit. According to 
research,256 many entrepreneurs start small businesses that do not get to a point where 
they employ more than one employee,257 the self-employed entrepreneur.258 Only a 
small percentage of SMEs get to a point where they hire more than five employees.259 
From such statistics and for contemplation in a different study, questions can be asked 
as to whether or not creation of new SMEs creates a significant number of jobs for a 
vibrant economy.260 
A major driving force for the job creation element awarded to SMEs is venture capital. 
SMEs that have a proven rapid growth track as signified by aspects such as the number 
of employees are fodder for venture capitalists. More employees indicate the demand 
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for the goods or services that are offered by that business.261 This requires the hiring of 
personnel to provide said goods or services to meet the demand. 262  Such a trend 
encourages VC firms to offer early stage investment to the businesses because VC firms 
look for company profiles that signify rapid growth to the benefit of both the VC 
investors and the entrepreneurs. Also, the fact that there is a demand for goods or 
services offered by a business galvanizes VC investment given that VC firms will 
anticipate a big market to be penetrated if the business can acquire adequate capital to 
expand their operations.263 
3.4 How venture capital works 
The principle of partnerships applies in venture capital funds in most countries across 
the globe; VC funds are created as limited partnerships, the investor base forms the 
passive/silent limited partners while the venture capitalists automatically become the 
general partners.264 In their function, the limited partners provide funds to be invested 
in expectation of high returns while the general partners exercise control and 
management of companies in the venture capital portfolio.265 
The venture capital industry relies on reputation,266 as the reputation of a VC fund 
grows; there is an increase in the demand for their services. Investors increasingly want 
to pool their resources and back the VCs behind that fund. Notably then, as a result of 
the increased demand for their services, venture capitalists are able to negotiate 
partnership agreements that have fewer legally restrictive impositions on their 
functions.267  
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The passive partners (investor base backing the VCF) enter into these types of 
imbalanced agreements because of the profitability involved in turning massive 
valuations from yet unproven and unprofitable businesses.268  
Incidences of conflict that lead to require resolution in this sort of arrangements 
between the limited/passive partners and general partners (the VCs) are rare.269 There 
is little motivation for the limited partners to sue their counterparts when they are 
regularly enjoying good returns on their investment. 270  The absence of substantial 
litigation in the VC industry can also be explained by the fact that both the limited and 
general partners have developed a working relationship that relies on reputation.271 
Like businesses that rely on repeat clientele, VC firms operate in a manner designed to 
encourage their investor partners to invest in future funds. 272 The motivation to 
maintain good working relationships with the general partners is replicated by the 
limited partners because they hope to be involved in future partnerships.273 Therefore, 
they agree to contracts giving their partners the appropriate discretion needed in order 
to act effectively as mangers and advisors of the SME companies they have funded.274    
The practice is that, general partners, invest 1% of the capital and yet receive absolute 
control of the partnership, the rest of the funding comes from limited partners.275 There 
seems to be an overriding imbalance in play when the capital contribution is considered. 
It is explained away however by the fact that, the general partners contribute 
principally through their financial expertise and experience in running VCFs as 
opposed to monetarily.276 They manage, consult, and monitor extensively the SME 
                                                          
268 Rosenberg D, ‘The two cycles of venture capital’, 421. 
269 Rosenberg D, ‘The two cycles of venture capital’, 421. 
270 Rosenberg D, ‘The two cycles of venture capital’, 421. 
271 Rosenberg D, ‘The two cycles of venture capital’, 421. 
272 Rosenberg D, ‘The two cycles of venture capital’, 421. 
273 Rosenberg D, ‘The two cycles of venture capital’, 421. 
274 Rosenberg D, ‘The two cycles of venture capital’, 421. 
275 Rosenberg D, ‘The two cycles of venture capital’, 421. 
276 Rosenberg D, ‘The two cycles of venture capital’, 421. 
52 
 
companies’ performance to ensure proper use of the funds allocated by the investors 
through the VC firm.277 
Venture capital makes use of unique financial contracts that align their priorities of 
gaining economic incentive and implementing control.278 These two aspects dictate the 
relationship between venture capitalists and SME owners.279  
The investor base is relegated to a passive role.280 They do not participate in affairs such 
as the day-to-day management of the venture firm or the SMEs that have received 
investment.281 Venture capitalists exercise control and management of the company in 
their portfolio.282  
3.5 Understanding the aspect of control 
There is a great deal of uncertainty, and information asymmetry between young firms 
and VCs.283 Information asymmetry between VCs and business owners has to do with 
the issue of proposed prospects of the company. 284  Venture capitalists are 
disadvantaged when gauging the likelihood of success of an entrepreneurs’ proposal.285  
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On the other hand, the entrepreneurs are reluctant to reveal critical information before 
terms have been agreed and a contract signed.286 Financial contracts are drafted with 
the specific intent of assisting in satisfying the commercial needs of both parties.287 
The challenges that exist for SMEs seeking access to finance have been discussed at 
length by this point.288 VC funds offer a viable solution that can address the challenge of 
information gaps.289 The tools VC funds have as remedy is their intensive scrutiny of 
firms before availing funding and thorough monitoring afterwards.290  
VCs monitor using tools such as offering financing in stages over a period of time, 
taking up seats in the company’s board of directors, and offering stock options as part 
of compensation arrangements for senior staff.291 
Staged financing is the most potent avenue by which VCs exercise their control over the 
company.292 The owner of the business is kept in line thus reducing losses from bad 
managerial decisions. They are held accountable by the VCs and decisions they make or 
changes they want to implement have to fit in with the business strategy for that stage 
of financing.  
The use of equity as a substantial part of compensation packages for managers and 
critical staff is used by VCs to exert influence.293 As a control mechanism, the vesting of 
stocks to managers and critical staff ensures that they cannot leave the company and 
take the stocks especially so for inventors. 294  This measure gives venture capital 
investors the confidence they need in the enterprise for the period of time that they will 
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be a part of the enterprise. It limits a scenario where the key players in the enterprise 
being funded decide to abandon the venture short-changing the VC investors.     
VCs can as well elect to dilute the shares of the entrepreneur when granting subsequent 
financing as repercussions for the failure by the company to reach its expected 
targets.295 Each layer of financing offered by VC funds has attached to it milestones to 
be achieved as a prerequisite for further funding increasing the potency of staged 
financing as control tool for VCs. Therefore, entrepreneurs will work hard to meet 
targets in order to keep a sizeable stake of the company stock they worked hard to 
build.296            
It is for the sake of monitoring efforts that VC contracts allow for the retention of 
complete control of companies by VCs to an extent where VCs can choose to terminate 
the entrepreneurs.297 The composition of top management raises a lot of contention for 
VCs and entrepreneurs, VCs find that professional top management would be more 
valuable to the enterprise because founders can act in their own interest as opposed to 
the interests of the company. 298  Entrepreneurs do not want to leave management 
because of the attachment that they have developed. 299  VCs who have attained 
complete control of an enterprise may then easily opt to dissolve the business or 
restructure it in a way that keeps them from incurring further losses in case the business 
ends up in failure, contrary to their projections.300 Concurrently, the entrepreneurs are 
usually in dire need of capital therefore making them amenable to relinquishing certain 
aspects of their control to the VCs in exchange for funding the business.301 
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Control of the company is returned to the entrepreneurs if the venture is a success and 
the investors gain hefty investment returns. 302  Entrepreneurs are as well greatly 
incentivized by the handsome returns to work hard on the novel ideas they required 
funding for. 303  Monitoring by the VCs is done with extra efforts because of the 
extremely risky nature of this type of investment expecting to gain the promise of high 
returns if the investment goes as planned.304 
VCs do not disburse funds to the businesses being funded in lump sums; the financing 
is staged where funds are made available in order.305 The first stage, the seed/startup 
stage a small amount of financing is granted to the inventor/entrepreneur to help them 
prove the concept or create a prototype.306 Mid stage offers financing to companies for 
purposes of expansion, the venture capitalists’ role now switches from a support 
function to a strategic role, coming up with workable plans that involve marketing or 
the creation of an improved product.307  
After each round of financing, the VCs will examine the project’s success in order to 
forward further funding.308 The terms of later rounds of financing are negotiated after 
each stage.309 The bargain is tilted towards the VCs at this point because they can opt to 
stop funding the business after a stage ends.310 VCs use this to bargain for more control 
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in monitoring the company. The control mechanism is therefore complemented by the 
staging of the investment.311  
The right to control management of the company offers VCs a reinforced mandate to 
execute monitoring efforts. 312  VCs have the ability to choose a majority of the 
company’s directors even when their shareholding in the company is in the 
minority.313Their effective control of the board making them able to appoint a new CEO, 
and other such actions is gotten from a board majority vote and in certain instances it is 
explicitly contracted before any form of financing relationship is off the ground.314 
When VCs detect problems with a founding CEO, they engage in a search for a new one 
and exercise their control over the board to appoint him/her forcing the founder out of 
management. There is very little recourse for the CEO because VC agreements by their 
nature give venture capitalists strong control rights and give the entrepreneurs little to 
no protection.     
Further, the company enters into several negative covenants with the VCs in their 
contracts which end up requiring that the VCs must offer approval before any big 
business decisions are made.315 Failure to keep the covenants results in default. An 
event of default in financial law contracts carries heavy consequences that 
entrepreneurs strive to avoid.   
As discussed, VCs enter into financial contracts with entrepreneurs to provide capital 
for a period of time, hopefully achieve profitability before they exit with returns on 
their investment. Venture capitalists plan their exit strategy before they invest in a 
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company, they need the ability to determine their exit and live up to their short term 
funding business model.316 
Venture capitalists get this ability to determine their exit from their control over the 
board of directors in the company they invest in by having their exit rights explicitly 
stated in the contracts and/or by ceasing to continue offering the business further 
funding.317 
The exit strategy is chosen by the VCs depending on the company’s prospects at the 
point where exit is necessary; be it through a share sell once an initial public offer (IPO) 
is made or by mode of an acquisition of the company by another.318  
The rights of VCs in controlling exit should not however be overstated, at the early 
stages of the VC relationship;319 VCs do not have complete control of the board of 
directors in the portfolio company,320 that type of control is negotiated after a period of 
time and gained with additional funding as granted by the VC fund. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The point to stress is that in venture capital, the aspect of control of the business is vital. 
Entrepreneurs on their own volition decide to relinquish control of their SME 
companies to venture capitalists in exchange for capitalization. The VCs then exercise 
control by engaging in actions best suited for the company based on their expertise; an 
example being installing professional management in the outfit. These actions are 
geared towards attaining profitability. 
Control is integral in venture capital as a specialized financial instrument because 
without it, the risks to be borne by the venture capitalists become too great making the 
entire VC industry a toxic environment for investors. The confidence in VCs’ ability to 
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utilize their management and technical expertise to monitor a company in their 
portfolio allows for the thriving of the VC industry. Entrepreneurs who are unwilling to 
relinquish certain aspects of control can elect to seek financing from private investors 


















THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CONTROL BY THE COMPETITION 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN KENYA  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter undertakes to look at the competition regulation that is provided for in the 
Kenyan legal system. In doing so, it will focus on regulations that affect venture capital 
funds and their course to establish a vibrant venture capital industry in Kenya. This 
chapter looks at the issue of control based on the regulatory framework available in 
Kenya and shows how that creates ramifications for the venture capital industry. 
4.2 Examining the relevant provisions of the Competition Act  
The Competition Act, 2010; 321  is a law enshrined by the Kenyan parliament with 
stipulated objectives intended to elevate the welfare of the Kenyan people through the 
promotion and protection of efficient competition in the Kenyan markets;322 this is 
achieved by preventing market conduct that would mislead the public (consumers) 
and/or create unfairness.323   
These preventive mechanisms put in place hope to; 324  spur efficiency in the 
manufacturing, dissemination and supply of products and services,325 renew efforts in 
the attempt to sufficiently protect consumers from bad actors,326 create a favourable 
economic environment that would spur investments by both local and foreign actors 
into the Kenyan market,327 and promote innovation.328 
                                                          
321 Act No. 12 of 2010, Laws of Kenya.  
322 Section 3, The Competition Act (Act No. 12 of 2010).  
323 Section 3, The Competition Act (Act No. 12 of 2010).  
324 Section 3, The Competition Act (Act No. 12 of 2010). 
325 Section 3(a), The Competition Act (Act No. 12 of 2010). 
326 Section 3(d), The Competition Act (Act No. 12 of 2010). 
327 Section 3(e), The Competition Act (Act No. 12 of 2010). 
328 Section 3(b), The Competition Act (Act No. 12 of 2010). 
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Application of the Competition Act goes beyond the bounds of Kenyan territory. The 
act applies to conduct outside of Kenya if it is engaged in by a citizen or a person 
residing in Kenya,329 a corporation duly incorporated in Kenya or simply engaging in 
business activities in Kenya,330 and a person outside Kenya acquiring shares or assets 
that results into a change of control of a business in Kenya.331  
The inclusion of these provisions in the law ensures that foreign investors seeking to 
venture with Kenyan SMEs are subject to adhere to the competition law by virtue of its 
extra territorial nature. Practices deemed anti- competitive by application of this Act 
cannot be outside its purview if committed by citizens, legal residents or bodies 
corporate; whether incorporated under the Companies Act, 332  2015 or not, and 
foreigners acquiring a significant amount of  shares or assets in a company the result 
being a change of control in the regular running of the business.  
Issues of control and their integral nature in venture capital arrangements have been 
discussed at length in chapter three of this thesis. From the understanding of how 
venture capitalists require control rights that are exerted in many ways such as the 
appointment of CEOs to gaining seats in the directorial board of a company and 
overseeing the day to day running of a company among others; friction arises when 
those control rights accrued by a venture capital fund qualify the contracting of venture 
capital agreements between the VC fund and the SME company to be mergers as per 
the provisions of the Competition Act. This categorization of VC arrangements as 
mergers comes with some serious implications that will be addressed. 
Mergers 
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Mergers occur when previously independent entities combine to form one firm.333 For 
purposes of competition, the combination being formal such that the two firms become 
one or instead, being the purchase of another firm’s stock or assets makes no difference 
when evaluating mergers.334 Neither does it matter where after merging; the acquired 
firm becomes a subsidiary with legal personhood and continues to exist. 335  What 
matters is that, separate businesses with independent motives combine their efforts to 
form one common ownership arrangement giving the businesses a shared profit 
motive.336  
When stock is acquired and the result is that one firm gains effective control over 
another, it is treated as a merger. 337  Even partial stock purchases can be deemed 
anticompetitive even though they do not give enough control to create a merger.338 
These acquisitions of a non-controlling stake are condemned by competition regimes 
based on theories that they reduce competition by: giving the purchaser the ability to 
hold significant influence in the firm and thus can affect the target firm’s competitive 
conduct;339 giving the acquiring firm confidential material in the target firm that could 
cause anticompetitive shifts in the market; 340  or reduce/eradicate completely the 
financial motivation for the two firms to carry on competing with each other.341              
As defined by the Act, mergers refer to acquisition of shares, businesses, or assets of a 
business that is in Kenya or outside Kenya that leads to a change of control of that 
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business, a part of that business or an asset of the business. 342  Takeovers are also 
included under the definition of mergers.343 
Competition regulatory provisions in relation to venture capital 
The Competition Act extensively addresses the topic of mergers under part IV of the 
Act. The legislation further points out that a merger happens when an undertaking 
directly or indirectly acquires or establishes direct or indirect control over an entire 
business or part of the business of another undertaking.344 From this characterization, it 
becomes clear that by default the engagement of venture capital with a business which 
involves a transfer of the company’s shares to a venture capitalist together with the 
allocation of significant control rights in exchange for capital from the VC fund by an 
entrepreneur amounts to a merger. 
Features of a venture capital contract with a business meet the mandate required to be 
classified as a merger according to the Competition Act. The first mandate is met when 
the VC contract requires that the company’s shares be transferred into the possession of 
the VCs who at that point become members of the company holding a keen interest in 
the affairs of the company to secure their investment.345 The second mandate is met 
because VC investors as opposed to private equity investors do not take a back seat but 
actively monitor and exercise control by making decisions that in their expert analysis 
(a valued distinguishing advantage that venture capital transactions offer) would be 
beneficial to the company even though the company can be operated independently 
                                                          
342 Section 2, The Competition Act (Act No. 12 of 2010). 
343 Section 2, The Competition Act (Act No. 12 of 2010). 
344 Section 41(1), The Competition Act (Act No. 12 of 2010). 
Note that, the Competition Act uses the term ‘undertaking’ all through its discourse. The word 
‘undertaking’ as envisaged by Section 2 of the Act means a business intended to be operated for the 
purpose of profit making by a person, partners, or a trust having the aim of producing, supplying or 
distributing goods and or providing services. The act also views trade associations as undertakings.      
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without ‘interference’ from the investors as is usually the case in private equity 
investments.346     
The Act then sets out the parameters of control in an effort to sum up what is viewed by 
the law as achieving control. Of key relevance to this thesis are the provisions asserting 
that control is achieved if a person has a majority of the votes or can control the way a 
majority of those votes can be cast,347 and the other being that a person has control if 
they have the ability to appoint or veto the appointment made by a majority of directors 
in the company.348  
On the issue of votes, VCs contractually bargain to have the ability to choose the 
majority of a company’s directors even when they have a shareholding in the company 
that is in the minority,349 it follows that in lieu of having such influence over the 
company’s board of directors, the VCs can determine how votes will be cast and the 
resolutions/decisions that those votes will lead to.  
Based on the fact that they hold effective control over the board means that venture 
capitalists can by majority vote choose to make appointments to the board or quash any 
appointments to the board as have been proposed by the other members.350 
The Competition Authority (the Authority) is established by the Act as an independent 
and impartial institution. 351  The main function of the Authority is to ensure that 
compliance with the provisions of the Act is enforced.352 In this regard, the Authority 
provided guidelines to assist in determining how the Authority made their assessment 
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on merger issues and to inform the users on the Authority’s jurisdiction in exercising 
their functions concerning review of merger transactions.353  
Merger guidelines 
The guidelines termed as ‘Consolidated Guidelines on the Substantive Assessment of 
Mergers under the Competition Act’ are merely regulatory principles applied by the 
Authority to achieve regulatory best practice, they do not have behind them the force of 
law.354 The guidelines are not intended to substitute the legal provisions in the Act 
dealing with mergers.355 The guidelines are to be understood through the lenses of the 
Act.356 These guidelines were created with the intention of equipping its users both 
businesses and their legal representation with information pertaining to how the 
authority carries out its review and analysis on proposed merger transactions in 
determining approval, 357  declination, 358  and approval subject to conditions of said 
mergers.359 
The guidelines give light to Section 41(1) of the Act by giving explanation to what is 
meant when the Act mentions ‘direct control’, and ‘indirect control’.360 Under Section 
41(3) some parameters are provided that will lead one to presume that control has been 
established.361 The Authority in creating the guidelines sought to look at other aspects 
which prove control when making the decision when there is uncertainty from 
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considering the share ownership in a proposed transaction having share transfers worth 
more than or less than 50%.362 
Guidelines on direct control 
To start with, acquisition of direct control is explained by the guidelines. It is viewed by 
the Authority that when a transaction can result to a scenario where one party to the 
proposed merger gains full control over a whole business or a part of it, to an extent 
that they can exercise complete influence over the undertakings and decision making of 
the acquired business, such a situation constitutes an acquirer having direct control.363   
The Authority reviews the evidence of the proposed transactions in the form of business 
documents such as share purchase agreements among other contractual agreements. In 
reviewing the evidentiary material, the Authority focuses its interest in assessing 
whether the agreements lead to a situation where one party can exercise control and 
decisive influence over the running of the business.364  
It is specified in the Act under Section 41(3) that control is held if one owns more than 
50% of the share capital of the business. The authority goes further in extent of 
application of this rule by providing that an acquirer of less than 50% of the share 
capital of a business is presumed to have direct control if that share ownership has 
attached to it voting rights and decision-making capabilities.365  
If evidence that an acquirer of shares has veto rights attached to the share ownership 
acquired which can allow the acquirer the possibility of vetoing board decisions, 
directorial appointments to the board and the ability to decide senior 
management/staff appointments, strategic policies a business has in place, budget or 
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business plan; then, the Authority will consider such control as exercise of decisive 
influence.366  
Guidelines on indirect control 
As to the second aspect; acquisition of indirect control, the Authority under this 
categorization considers that a transaction proposed might have an acquirer who has 
diminished control over the target business but still can achieve material influence over 
the business’ affairs thus creating an indirect control, then, the proposed transaction is 
deemed to constitute an acquisition of indirect control.367 
Similarly, commercial agreements are assessed by the Authority to determine if an 
acquisition qualifies as having the element of indirect control. When the contracts 
reached by the parties give an acquiring party the ability to exercise material influence 
over key business decisions of an undertaking, the Authority takes note.368 
In doing so, lending contracts as an example of commercial agreements are examined 
by the Authority. A lending contract which gives the lender the powers to veto strategic 
business decisions of the acquired business, transfer managerial control to the acquirer, 
or an agreement that demands that an acquiring business becomes an advisor to the 
acquired business will face scrutiny from the Authority because it achieves indirect 
control.369  
A minority acquisition; an acquisition of below 20% of the voting shares which are held 
as passive investment in an undertaking minus any possibility of exercising influence 
over the affairs of an undertaking shall not be deemed to be acquisitions of indirect 
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control.370 This explanation by the Authority guidelines sets the tone clear alienating a 
private equity investment which does not qualify as a merger from venture capital 
investment. 
Venture capital as an investment strategy is captured by these rules given that it has 
aspects that are attributable to both acquisition of direct and indirect control. Venture 
capital contracts by their very nature give VCs the powers to exercise control over a 
business in making key decisions. They have decisive influence granted to them and 
assented to by the business they are investing in. Naturally, as already discussed in 
chapter three of this thesis, VCs have veto powers to torpedo board decisions that are 
not in line with their investment strategy, prevent the appointment of a person to the 
board of directors and call for the dismissal of a CEO in the company in favour of 
another appointee of their choosing. 
An attribute of indirect control that captures VC arrangements is the ability of VCs to be 
invested in the strategic decision making of the business they are partnering with. They 
can veto strategies that based on their expertise will not result in business growth. Their 
advisory role a consideration that counts as a merit for SMEs that are yet to figure out 
proper corporate governance and general business management, a strength that the 
VCs bring to the table makes venture capital transactions qualify as acquisitions of 
indirect control subject to merger rules under the Act. 
Implications of the competition protocols   
Transactions deemed to be mergers give rise to implications under the Act. The first 
implication is that any transaction of any size which based on the statutory standard set 
out in the Act and complemented by the Consolidated Guidelines has the effect of 
qualifying as a ‘merger’ is supposed to be approved of by the Authority. 371  It is 
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stipulated that no party may put into effect a proposed merger unless that merger has 
been approved by the Authority,372 and performed according to the conditions given 
upon approval of the merger by the Authority.373 
Merger agreements that are entered into by parties and carried out without 
authorization from the Authority have no legal effect. 374  The parties to such an 
agreement cannot sue and successfully enforce performance of the contract through 
recognized legal channels.375 
Payment of the full price of purchase by the acquirer is seen as an implementation of 
the proposed merger transaction.376 However making a down payment; a percentage of 
the contractual amount does not signify implementation of a merger transaction.377 
Contravention of the law that requires all proposed mergers be authorized by the 
Competition Authority before the parties proceed to implementation raises criminal 
implications.378 Upon conviction of the offence, the offender can face a jail term of not 
more than five years or be charged a fine worth no more than ten million shillings or 
face both punishments.379  
In addition to that, the Competition Act was amended to allow the Authority the ability 
to impose a financial penalty on the businesses involved in the merger transaction; the 
penalty would make up ten percent of the prior year’s gross turnover.380 Such penalties 
would apply for parties that provide misleading and incorrect information with regards 
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to a merger proposal or for parties that failed to comply with any conditions that the 
authority imposed in order for the merger approval to be granted.381                     
The Authority demands that a notification be made of any proposed merger.382 Each 
party to the transaction will have to notify the Authority.383 The notification has to be 
made in writing as per the prescribed format.384 After initial notification of the proposal 
to merge is made, the Authority may require within a period of 30 days from date of 
first notification that one or both parties provide them with additional information.385 
In practice, after notification of the Authority is done, the Authority recognizes that the 
application has been received within three days.386 The authority has a time period of 60 
days to consider and review the merger application.387 As pointed out, the Authority 
could require further information after receiving the merger application. 388  Upon 
receipt of further information the Authority has 60 days to reach a determination.389 The 
Act grants the Authority powers to conduct a hearing,390 and then make a decision 
within 30 days after the conclusion of hearing.391  
Summed up, the process takes about 180 days for the Authority to make a decision on 
authorization of a merger. 392  This time period presents a challenge for sensitive 
transactions like venture capital arrangements and is undesirable for investors seeking 
to invest in Kenyan businesses.  
This requirements would end up exerting costly, time consuming, and strenuous 
burden with regard to compliance on both parties in a venture capital arrangement, 
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especially so for the SME seeking to gain capital from venture capital financiers, when 
said requirements need not apply to VC transactions. 
4.3 Conclusion 
The Competition Act has as one of its objectives the intent of creating an enabling 
environment conducive for local and foreign investment. This is stipulated under 
Section 3(e) of the Act. With regards to venture capital investment, it is evident that that 
aim has not been achieved and instead the possibility for such investment is hindered 
by the preceding statutory provisions. 
From the examination of competition regulation in this chapter and the guidelines 
indicating how those laws are applied by the regulatory authority, it is evident that the 
provisions pertaining to mergers in the Competition Act create an impediment to 
venture capital activity in Kenya that should be addressed so that the Kenyan market 
can be encouraging to investors who wish to provide VC financing without the strain of 











CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter offers conclusions reached by the study; it also gives answers to the 
research questions tackled and in doing so confirms the hypothesis proposed by this 
thesis. Recommendations are made that could aid the development of the venture 
capital industry in Kenya. 
5.2 Summary  
This thesis hypothesized that restructuring the legal and regulatory framework 
governing mergers under the competition laws of Kenya and reviewing the provisions 
that unreasonably require notification of the regulator followed by a strenuous 
compliance process so as to make the regulatory landscape more responsive to the 
peculiarities brought about by VC financing of SMEs is a necessary step towards 
addressing the challenge of poor capitalization that SMEs face.  
At its foundation, this thesis asked questions that were a guiding tool in understanding 
the hypothesis of the study. The research questions had the objective of helping to gain 
an understanding of the existing venture capital industry in Kenya; they also sort to 
give insight into how VC funds operate in financing SMEs; they asked about the legal 
and regulatory framework for venture capital in Kenya that proves problematic to a 
vibrant VC presence in the country. The final objective aimed at offering 
recommendations based on the research that could be implemented to stimulate the 
growth of the Kenyan VC industry. 
The methodology adopted for this research heavily relied on the analysis of primary, 
secondary and tertiary sources of information. The sources of knowledge drawn from 
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include newspapers, reports, textbooks, philosophical treatises, journal articles and 
statutes. 
The thesis is partitioned into five chapters. The first chapter lays the framework for the 
study as a whole, contextualizing the research problem.  
The chapter also offers a background for the thesis; setting the parameters for the three 
aspects of the study: VC, SMEs, and competition; a statement of the problem, the 
study’s hypothesis and research questions, literature review, justification of the study, a 
theoretical framework and the methodology used in conducting the study, limitations 
and assumptions in the research, and a chapter breakdown. 
Chapter two purposed to give an overview of venture capital in Kenya; discussing its 
development and putting into context some of the challenges faced by VC funds and 
how the government has attempted to ameliorate said problems to attract investment 
into the Kenyan economy. 
The third chapter drills down on the question of control in venture capital agreements 
between VCs and enterprises exposing the tension points that clash with Kenyan laws 
and regulations. The chapter briefly gives insight into the development of venture 
capital to further illustrate how venture capital works.  
Chapter four exposes competition regulations that are antagonistic to the nature in 
which venture capital finances SMEs. The matter of ‘control’ as envisioned by Kenyan 
laws is expounded upon revealing tension that arises with VC involvement 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter finds that the competition laws on mergers and the regulatory frameworks 
that have been set up to aid in the interpretation of the Competition Act creates a less 
inviting environment for the development of VC in Kenya. In order to create a 
sustainable VC environment in Kenya, good policies and effective measures have to be 
adopted by regulators and legislators in their respective capacities to alleviate the 
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challenges that VC funds and SMEs under the current competition regulation may 
encounter. Alleviation of these challenges is likely to encourage growth of the VC sector 
and consequently the SME sector which in turn boosts the national economy. 
As discussed in chapter two, Kenya has great potential to establish herself as a hub for a 
booming venture capital industry benefitting SMEs in the East African region. This is 
because the country offers the advantage of being a big economy in the region with a 
welcoming business environment for foreign investment.  
The challenges that face the VC industry are not catastrophic to the industry prospects; 
they can be resolved. 
The first challenge that arises is that preliminarily, there is no overarching legislative 
statute providing parameters for a venture capital industry. Closely linked to the first 
challenge is the fact that in Kenya, regulation for VC activity is dispersed and can be 
found under different regulatory ambits each with strenuous, repetitive and expensive 
compliance procedures that have to be met by VC funds and enterprises seeking VC 
financing.  
The other challenge revolves around the crucial matter of exit for venture capital firms. 
The preferred exit option through the stock markets is not a viable option in Kenya as 
things currently stand. 
The competition laws in Kenya define ‘control’ in a manner that raises a challenge for 
venture capitalists. For VCs, control is an essential aspect of their business model, as 
pointed out in chapter three. This control is relinquished voluntarily by entrepreneurs 
who receive necessary financing for their businesses. With control that can be exercised 
in different ways; VCs take actions that are intended to benefit the company and make 
it profitable by relying on their expertise and business experience. 
This take on the importance of control for VCs coupled with the legal provisions 
governing control as provided for by the Competition Act and regulatory guidelines 
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covered extensively in chapter four leads to the primary conclusion that to enhance 
development of the venture capital industry in Kenya, a precondition necessary to 
sustaining a flourishing SME sector, the legal provisions under the Competition Act on 
mergers have to be restructured and fashioned in a manner that is amenable to VC 
funds. 
5.4 Recommendations 
In planning for the future, Kenya has to maintain relevance and competitiveness in the 
global economy. The current legal and regulatory environment for VC funds is not 
conducive for a thriving investment environment. Specific policy and regulatory 
frameworks have to be re-examined to encourage VC investment. These 
recommendations could help policy makers, legislators and regulators ensure the 
development of the Kenyan VC sector. 
It would be a step in the right direction for policy formulators and legislators to create a 
special law governing venture capital operations in Kenya. This law would oversee the 
aspects of registration, taxation and regulation of venture capital firms under a single 
institution/authority that would act as the main regulator. This law should be made 
after careful consideration and conducting a serious consultation process with key 
experts who have a thorough understanding of venture capital financing and its legal 
implications. 
Having a single regulatory regime as proposed through the institution of a special VC 
law would cure the secondary challenge of having a dispersed regulatory regime as it 
currently exists leading to strenuous compliance requirements. Understandably, the 
process of law making is rigorous and takes time, as it should; therefore, making a 
special law for VCs could take a considerable amount of time. In the meantime however, 




Spearheaded by the Capital Markets Authority which holds regulatory oversight over 
venture capital in Kenya, the streamlining and simplification process should be 
embarked upon bringing to the table the various regulators involved in venture capital 
activity such as the offices of the registrar for income tax and companies, together with 
the Competition Authority of Kenya.  
In doing so, these regulators can agree by signing a memorandum of understanding 
clearly stipulating their roles in relation to venture capital. They can limit their 
requirements for registration of VC firms and the compliance protocols they demand. 
This helps to avoid a lot of the repetition that is found in the venture capital laws 
offered by the different legal provisions.  
Such a measure has the effect of reducing the expense involved and the time factor 
encountered when going through compliance procedures with more than one regulator.  
Another recommendation would be on the issue of exit options for venture capital firms. 
This matter is of interest to this study however it deserves more nuanced discussion in a 
different forum. In Kenya and Africa at large, the capital market exchanges are under 
developed and highly illiquid. This fact creates a challenge for venture capital investors 
as they consider ways to recoup their investment in successful enterprises. 
Building a thriving capital market is not an endeavour that could be carried out 
overnight even with necessary extra incentives. Capital markets all over the world have 
strict listing requirements that bar entry of SMEs. It is for this reason that stock 
exchanges have created second tier stock exchange markets with relaxed listing 
requirements that can offer a possible exit avenue for venture capitalists.  
The United Kingdom under the London Stock Exchange has Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM), South Africa has a second tier capital market under the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange dubbed AltX (The Johannesburg Alternative Exchange). Similarly, in 
Kenya, GEMS (Growth Emerging Market Segment) was instituted in 2013 to enable 
Kenyan SMEs access financing through the capital markets. Venture capitalists can 
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utilize GEMS when considering exit options if the market is strengthened and becomes 
liquid. Awareness campaigns informing the stakeholders of the usefulness of GEMS 
will aid in building its capacity and strengthening the market a goal that can be 
accomplished over a considerably short period of time. 
Of utmost importance to this thesis, having the Competition Authority reassess their 
policy on the crucial issue of control would go a long way in enabling venture capital 
activity in Kenya. Arguably, the Authority could limit the application of the merger 
directives on control as stipulated by the Competition Act by issuing a temporary block 
exemption for venture capital and SME transactions.  
Having this differentiation will recognize the fundamental distinctness between venture 
capital contracting to aid in SME financing and mergers as understood in common 
parlance; that is not the case in the current regulatory regime. 
The exemption of venture capital transactions in merger control measures included in 
the Competition Act would have the effect of discarding the mandatory notification 
required from both the venture capital fund and the SME seeking to access funding. In 
addition, any sanctions pursuant to part IV of the Competition Act would be rendered 
inapplicable. 
The exemption would have to be instituted as a stopgap measure pending the passing 
of a special VC law which would have a more refined understanding of venture capital 
operations and its legal connotations.  
This measures if adopted will benefit SMEs and ensure that they have a viable option in 
venture capital financing to mitigate the issue of access to capital which has impeded 
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